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**INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL AUDIT AND COMMUNITY SCORECARD MECHANISMS OF CIVIL SOCIETY
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ABSTRACT

This research sought to investigate the Influence of social audit and community scorecard mechanisms of civil society organizations on governance in Kenya. A review of both empirical and theoretical literature examined how the social accountability mechanisms that civil society organisations utilise contributed to enhancing governance in Kenya. Specifically, the study looked at the influences of social audit and community scorecard on governance and the moderating effect of government regulations. Using cross-sectional survey research design, the study targeted 80 civil society organisations who were involved in social accountability initiatives across the country. The study employed purposive sampling to pick the sample while data was collected using a questionnaires. Quantitative data was analysed using inferential statistics using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) while the analysis of qualitative data was done using content analysis. The researcher used multiple regression analysis. It was established that community scorecard and social audit had significant influence on governance in Kenya. It was further established that government regulations moderated the relationship between social accountability mechanisms used by the civil organizations and governance in Kenya. This study recommended that civil society should utilize appropriate social accountability mechanisms and tools in enhancing good governance in Kenya. Further study could also focus on the impact of social audit and community scorecard mechanisms on specific service delivery areas such as health, education or social services and determine which social accountability mechanisms could also give more information on its contribution to accountability.

Key words: Social Audit, Community Score Card, Government Regulations, Governance, Civil Society Organisations

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INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, tackling accountability challenges has emphasised on supply-side governance through political checks and balances, law enforcement bodies, administrative regulations and police. These “top-down” mechanisms for promoting accountability have, however not been successful in many developed and developing countries. Similarly, newer measures such as vigilance commissions such as the Ethics and Anti-corruption Commissions, and office of the ombudsman, among others have not had the expected results either (Mulgan, 2000). In this regard, the civil society has been recognized as a major pillar of the demand-side accountability (Ahmad, 2008).

Reasons for bottom-up or demand-side accountability include; dissatisfaction with the way the government has performed its functions, meagre returns and reduced productivity from public investments, lack of transparency, reduced implementation of the rule of law, and corruption (IEA Kenya 2015). Other reasons include failing to balance the economy through poverty eradication, injustice particularly when dealing with the marginalized groups, inequity, failure of the current public accountability assurance mechanisms in resolving problems relating to accountability and governance, lack of credible elections.

The civil society in Kenya is vital in the pursuit for transparency, social justice and accountability (Wanyande, 2010). Civil society activism has been a platform providing objective voice to the larger political activism. Similarly, a number of initiatives in promoting social accountability spearheaded by the civil society are currently on going in the country (IEA, 2014). In spite of these efforts, widespread lack of public accountability in governance continues to be witnessed.

According to World Bank (2006), social accountability is a variety of actions and mechanisms that surpass voting, used by citizens to hold the state accountable and, actions on the part of the media, government, civil society and other actors in the society to encourage or enable these

efforts. Social accountability complements formal accountability mechanisms. It is citizen-led, resulting in the reinforcement and improvement of vertical accountability within the state through pressuring institutional offices for instance the ombudsman or anti-corruption commissions to execute their oversight role.

The civil society in Kenya is regulated under the legal provisions of the Public Benefits Organisation (PBO) Act 2013, administered by the NGOs Coordination Board. The Act provides for the establishment, growth and operations of Public Benefits Organisations (PBOs); to create an institutional and regulatory framework within which Public Benefits Organisations can operate and for any other purposes relating to the operations of the organizations (PBO Act, 2013). Its predecessor, the NGO Coordination Board, began in 1992 and had the duty of regulating, facilitating and promoting the NGO sector in Kenya by registration, facilitation and coordination of all national and international NGOs who run their operations in Kenya.

The civil society in Kenya is also organized through a self-regulating body, the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) Council of Kenya. The NGO Council has a membership of over eight thousand five hundred NGOs, including network organizations comprising of a broad membership representing various sectors and scope (Wanyande, 2010).

The demand for more engagement on social accountability in Kenya has further been accentuated by the new constitutional dispensation, which among other things ushered in devolution. Through a number of constitutional and legal provisions (Constitution of Kenya 2010; County Government Act 2012 & Public Finance Management (PFM) Act 2012), a requirement for active public engagement on the affairs of the state has been provided for. Mechanisms are procedures used in collection and analysis of data related to answering specific questions (WB, 2005). The mechanisms of social accountability are many and with significant variances and similarities.

There are different mechanisms and tools that have been established to aid in promoting social accountability. This study adopted the above categorization and interrogated the influence of social audit and community scorecards as social accountability mechanisms of civil society on governance in Kenya.

Statement of the Problem

Civil society organisations strive to seek an active voice in the planning of the local development, formulating of budgets, demanding government accountability in local resources allocation, enhancement of revenue and tracking how resources are used and the effect of programs and policies on citizenry. In achieving this, they utilize a number of mechanisms, tools and approaches. The need to increase the intake of opinions and priorities of citizens into consideration in design of policies, plans, budgets and programmes affecting them and a need to provide adequate structures and systems for CSOs/citizens to air their grievances to relevant authorities continue to be raised (Puddington & Piano 2009). Similarly, empowerment of citizens to take adequate measures to safeguard their rights to quality basic services without prejudice and existence of sufficient administrative mechanisms and codes of conduct that promotes the use of social accountability mechanisms aimed at enhancing governance in Kenya remains legitimate concern. Furthermore, the civil society organisations who have emerged as the champions of these demand-side initiatives of social accountability continue to lament an absence of national and local government responsiveness (Thindwa, 2006).

Effectiveness of social accountability in Kenya is dependent on the extensiveness and character of the civil society. Though there are efforts within the civil society to mitigate these limitations by collaboration and building alliances and constructive networks, the civil society's authority, legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness are challenged as a result of poor approaches, poor accountability approaches and assertions of

manipulation of donors (Geir, 2011). Furthermore, the efficiency of social accountability mechanisms employed by CSOs in Kenya are affected by their scale, short-term nature, use of differing methodologies and platforms as well as over-reliance on external donor support (KSG-CDS working Paper 1, 2015).

Studies (Tidemand 2009; Muriu 2013; Simiyu, Mweru and Omete, 2014; TI-Kenya 2014 & IEA, 2015) in the field of good governance and decentralisation have focused on how they enhance public participation and service delivery. Tidemand, (2009), undertook a comparative study of decentralisation, local level service delivery and governance in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. The study revealed that the impact of sector-specific efforts for governance decentralisation has been positive in enhancing citizen participation in a broad sense in planning and delivering services through user groups that are specific in a given sector, but negative in relation to participation of citizens in planning across different sectors and using local government councils to budget.

Simiyu, Mweru and Omete (2014) sought to establish the impacts of decentralized funding on social economic well-being of Kenyans. Looking at a case study of Constituency Development Fund in Kimilili Constituency, they established that there was important development in the situation of local people after the introduction of CDF. They concluded that the CDF plays a significant role in social economic aspects of the lives of the locals and called for policy makers to improve on management of the devolved funds. Similarly, Muriu (2013) sought to establish how the participation of citizens affect decentralised delivery of service. Looking at lessons learnt in the implementation of the Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plans - (LASDAP, 2002 – 2010), the study established that there is less participation of citizens in Kenya which results in negligence in delivering decentralized services. The research concludes that the first step towards participation institutionalization has been made which lays a foundation for the existing county government

structures despite the small impact of the participation of citizens.

These studies have dwelt on the effect of participation, social accountability and decentralised service delivery (Tidemand 2009; Muriu 2013; Simiyu *et al.*, 2014; TI-Kenya 2014 & IEA, 2015), and largely concentrated on the supply side, namely, the role of institutions and the state, and not on the role civil society organisations. These past studies have also not sought to establish the influence that social audit and community scorecard mechanisms have on governance in Kenya. This study, therefore, aimed at filling these gaps.

Objective of the Study

The general objective of the study was to establish the influence of the social audit and community scorecard mechanisms of civil society organization on governance in Kenya. The study specifically sought to:

- To establish the influence of social audit of civil society organisations on governance in Kenya
- To establish the influence of community score card of civil society organisations on governance in Kenya
- To determine whether government regulations moderate the relationship between social accountability mechanisms of civil society organisations and governance in Kenya

LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Framework

Legitimacy Theory

Legitimacy theory is derived from the concept of organisational legitimacy, which was advanced by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975). Legitimacy theory posits that organisations continually seek to ensure that they operate within the bounds and norms of their respective societies.

According to this theory, organizations come into existence and act by consent of the general society, hence required to be sensitive to all possible stakeholders. If organizations do not meet the expectations of the society in their actions, they will finally face increasing externally enacted controls over their behaviour. Thus, the government will do whatever they think is necessary to maintain their image of legitimacy with legitimate methods and aims of achieving it (Villiers & van Staden, 2006).

Legitimacy theory stipulates that states and the society have a social contract an indication of the social license to operate (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Chaffee 1985; Suchman 1995; LezRayman-Bacchus 2006 & Magness 2006). The theory is accredited to Suchman (1995) who argues that legitimacy is a generalized view or supposition that the activities of an entity are proper, desirable or suitable within some socially developed system of values, norms, definitions and beliefs.

Legitimacy theory is based upon the notion that the state activates a social contract, where it approves performing various actions that are socially desired in return for approval of its goals from the society. In legitimizing its actions through disclosure, the state justifies its continued existence. This theory suggests that the state aim to produce congruence between their activities and societal norms.

Policy Network Theory

The policy network theory began in late 1970s with two largely independent transatlantic development both part of a general shift in focus in political research in the twentieth century from formal hierarchy and jurisdiction to informal constellations of power and interests (Enroth, 2011)

This theory posits that our world encompasses networks and governance and policy-making are 'only achievable within networks, providing a framework for the efficient horizontal organization of the actions and interests of private and public corporate actors that mutually depend on their resources (Borzel, 1998). According to this theory, governance therefore involves many actors

interrelating in networks that work in the organisational and conceptual boundaries through ways in which the modern state has been understood for a long time: particularly the difference between the state and the civil society, and the distinction between public and private sector (Adam & Kriesi, 2007).

Policy network theory revolves between policy networks interpretations as an interest intermediation typology and policy networks interpretations as a precise form of governance. Interest intermediation deduces policy networks as a mediating aspect in the relationships between organized interests and the state. This approach suggests that the application of policy networks may be generic to different policy-specific

subsystems across national, international, and sub-national contexts (Adam & Kriesi, 2007).

According to the governance school, policy networks area precise governance form, an instrument to organize political resources in circumstances where these resources are widely distributed between public and private actors (Borzol, 1998). Many researchers limit network governance use to analytical models, which are important tools for interpretation of the observed policy network changing aspects and the outputs linked to them, but are descriptive in nature; making a causal inference in these circumstances seem questionable at best (Atkinson & Coleman 1989).

Conceptual Framework




Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

Source: Author (2019)

Empirical Review

There is a developing acknowledgment both among governments, private sector and civil society that communities and citizens have an imperative task to carry out to improve the accountability of public authorities, lessening corruption and leakage of assets and enhancing delivery of public services. Accordingly, social accountability has turned into an appealing way to deal with both people in the

public and civil society for enhancing administration forms, service conveyance results, and enhancing asset distribution choices. Throughout the most recent decades, various models have developed that exhibit how citizens can make their voice heard and viably take part in making the public sector more responsive and responsible (WB, 2005). Another study by Adabala *et al* (2004) revealed noteworthy cross-country difference in the

involvement with civil society cooperation in the social responsibility process in West African nations. The degree of interest relied upon the kind of government and the degree of majority rule culture; the limit of national experts to take part in participatory processes with citizens, civil society and key partners; and, the degree to which civil society groups exist and are dynamic among poor people. Despite incongruities in progress, the experience offered commendable exercises of civil society support in decentralized poverty reduction governance.

Arellano-Yanguas (2017) in 'Social Accountability and democratic deepening – Comparison of socially driven institutional strategies', explores social accountability and its potential to enhance governments' responsiveness and the legitimacy of democratic regimes. He posits that social accountability is the capacity of the civil society to control and influence the performance of public institutions, including political authorities, bureaucrats, and the public-related activities of private corporations. He explores the proliferation of mechanisms aimed at fostering accountability through the participation of civil society establishing that both civil society groups and public institutions have promoted these types of mechanisms. The analysis of those mechanisms, incorporating the comparison of socially driven and institutional initiatives, indicated interesting opportunity to improve our understanding of the extent to which the conditions and the processes through which those mechanism have contributed to improving accountability.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research employed a cross-sectional research design. Elahi and Dehdashti (2011) assert that a survey research is proper when the objectives of the research incorporate the accompanying factors. According to the NGO Council of Kenya (2014) records, there are 7,083 CSOs registered with them. As per the NGO Council categorization, it is estimated that 30% (2,125) of these CSOs are engaged with human rights and good governance

work (ARRE, 2009). This category of CSOs was used as the population of this study. The equation used to calculate the sample size for this study was as follows.

$$\begin{aligned}
 N &= \frac{z^2 \times p \times q \times N}{e^2 (N-1) + z^2 \times p \times q} \\
 &= \frac{1.96^2 \times 0.3 \times 0.7 \times 2,125}{0.1^2 (2,125 - 1) + 1.96^2 \times 0.3 \times 0.7} \\
 &= \frac{5714.111088}{71.013536} \\
 &= 80.46
 \end{aligned}$$

Where:

n = sample size

z = confidence level at 95% (Standard value of 1.96)

p = proportion in the target population estimated to have utilized social audit and community scorecard mechanisms

q = proportion in the target population estimated not to have utilized social accountability mechanisms

N = target population

e = level of statistical significance (0.05)

The sample of this research was drawn utilizing purposive sampling technique. A questionnaire was seen as the most appropriate tool as it is observed as the most precise tool to measure existing relationship that is self-sufficient, objects or events as well as beliefs and behaviour that is self-reported (Newman, 1997). The pilot test for this study was done by administering eight semi-structured questionnaire on eight respondents of civil society organizations. For this research, expressive insights, for example, mean scores, standard deviations, rates, and recurrence conveyance were processed to depict the attributes of the factors of value. Statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) computer software was utilized. Inferential statistics, for example, connection and relapse examination as proposed by Muthen and Muthen (2007) were utilized to build up the nature and greatness of the connections between the factors and to test the conjectured connections.

FINDINGS

Seventy-two questionnaires were administered to civil society organizations involved in human rights and governance in various parts of Kenya. The study managed to collect data from 60 respondents out

of 72, representing a response rate of 83.33%. This response rate was deemed adequate for the study based on Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) who recommended a response rate of 70% as being sufficient.

Table 1: Social Audit

| Statement | SD % | D % | DK % | A % | SA % | Mean | SD |
|---|------|-----|------|------|------|------|------|
| There are sufficiently competent numbers of stakeholders involved in the utilization of the mechanism, including vulnerable groups such as women, disabled, youth and minorities. | 0 | 5 | 5 | 70 | 20 | 4.05 | 0.68 |
| There are appropriate and objective performance criteria for the use of the mechanism. | 5 | 5 | 15 | 65 | 10 | 3.70 | 0.91 |
| The mechanism emphasizes both citizens' rights and responsibilities and help citizens develop a realistic understanding of the challenges and constraints faced by government through information sharing and dialogue. | 67.5 | 0 | 32.5 | 0 | 0 | 1.65 | 0.95 |
| There are sufficient records and data necessary for undertaking the mechanism. | 2.5 | 5 | 7.5 | 70 | 15 | 3.90 | 0.81 |
| The mechanism is able to adequately highlight social accountability issues it seeks to address. | 5 | 10 | 5 | 65 | 15 | 3.75 | 1.01 |
| The mechanism is anchored in law and it is clear to all involved on the degree of formalization. | 2.5 | 5 | 7.5 | 67.5 | 17.5 | 3.93 | 0.83 |
| There is appropriate follow up of the issues generated as a result of the use of the mechanism. | 2.5 | 10 | 5 | 70 | 12.5 | 3.80 | 0.88 |
| There is clear evidence of improvement in the service delivery as a result of use of the mechanism. | 2.5 | 10 | 2.5 | 60 | 25 | 3.95 | 0.96 |
| The mechanism is clear on lines of accountability in terms of planning, budgeting, expenditure, monitoring and evaluation. | 2.5 | 5 | 2.5 | 72.5 | 17.5 | 3.98 | 0.80 |
| The mechanism is yielding the intended results. | 7.5 | 15 | 42.5 | 22.5 | 12.5 | 3.18 | 1.08 |
| Lessons learnt in utilizing the mechanism is shared widely and used to improve the use of the mechanism | 0 | 5 | 5 | 70 | 20 | 4.05 | 0.68 |

Majority (70%) of the respondents agreed (Mean = 4.05 and SD = 0.68) that there are sufficiently competent numbers of stakeholders involved in the utilization of the mechanism, including vulnerable groups such as women, disabled, youth and minorities. The majority (65%) of the respondents agreed (Mean = 3.70 and SD = 0.91) that there are appropriate and objective performance criteria for the use of the mechanism. The majority (70 %) of the respondents agreed (Mean = 3.90 and SD = 0.81) that there are sufficient records and data necessary for undertaking the mechanism. The majority (65 %) of the respondents agreed (Mean =

3.75 and SD = 1.01) that the mechanism is able to adequately highlight social accountability issues it seeks to address. The majority (67.5%) of the respondents agreed (Mean = 3.93 and SD = 0.83) that the mechanism is anchored in law and it is clear to all involved on the degree of formalization. The majority (70 %) of the respondents agreed (Mean = 3.80 and SD = 0.88) that there is appropriate follow up of the issues generated as a result of the use of the mechanism. The majority (60%) of the respondents agreed (Mean = 3.95 and SD = 0.96) that here is clear evidence of improvement in the service delivery as a result of

use of the mechanism. The majority (72.5%) of the respondents agreed (Mean = 3.98 and SD = 0.80) that the mechanism is clear on lines of accountability in terms of planning, budgeting, expenditure, monitoring and evaluation. The majority (70 %) of the respondents do not know (Mean = 4.05 and SD = 0.68) that the lessons learnt in utilizing the mechanism is shared widely and used to improve the use of the mechanism. The majority (42.5%) of the respondents do not know

(Mean = 3.18 and SD = 1.08) that the mechanism is yielding the intended results. The majority (67.5%) of the respondents strongly disagreed (Mean = 1.65 and SD = 0.95) that the mechanism emphasizes both citizens' rights and responsibilities and help citizens develop a realistic understanding of the challenges and constraints faced by government through information sharing and dialogue.

Table 2: Community Scorecard Mechanism

| Statement | SD % | D % | DK % | A % | SA % | Mean | SD |
|---|------|-----|------|------|------|------|-------|
| The mechanism is well understood by all stakeholders | 2.5 | 2.5 | 72.5 | 15 | 7.5 | 3.22 | 0.733 |
| There are sufficiently competent numbers of stakeholders involved in the utilization of the mechanism, including vulnerable groups such as women, disabled, youth and minorities. | 2.5 | 7.5 | 65 | 17.5 | 7.5 | 3.2 | 0.790 |
| There are appropriate and objective performance criteria for the use of the mechanism. | 0 | 15 | 2.5 | 65 | 17.5 | 3.85 | 0.892 |
| The mechanism emphasizes both citizens' rights and responsibilities and help citizens develop a realistic understanding of the challenges and constraints faced by government through information sharing and dialogue. | 0 | 10 | 7.5 | 67.5 | 15 | 3.87 | 0.790 |
| There are sufficient records and data necessary for undertaking the mechanism. | 5 | 7.5 | 5 | 67.5 | 15 | 3.8 | 0.966 |
| The mechanism is able to adequately highlight social accountability issues it seeks to address. | 0 | 10 | 2.5 | 67.5 | 20 | 3.97 | 0.800 |
| The mechanism is anchored in law and it is clear to all involved on the degree of formalization. | 0 | 10 | 5 | 60 | 25 | 4 | 0.847 |
| There is appropriate follow up of the issues generated as a result of the use of the mechanism. | 0 | 2.5 | 7.5 | 65 | 25 | 4.12 | 0.647 |
| There is clear evidence of improvement in the service delivery as a result of use of the mechanism. | 12.5 | 5 | 0 | 77.5 | 7.5 | 3.77 | 0.767 |
| The mechanism is clear on lines of accountability in terms of planning, budgeting, expenditure, monitoring and evaluation. | 2.5 | 10 | 50 | 27.5 | 10 | 3.32 | 0.888 |
| The mechanism is yielding the intended results. | 12.5 | 5 | 0 | 70 | 12.5 | 3.82 | 0.812 |
| Lessons learnt in utilizing the mechanism is shared widely and used to improve the use of the mechanism | 2.5 | 5 | 7.5 | 75 | 10 | 3.85 | 0.769 |

As shown in Table 2, it was observed that the majority (65%) of the respondents agreed (Mean = 3.85 and SD = 0.892) that there are appropriate and objective performance criteria for the use of the mechanism. They (67.5%) also agreed (Mean = 3.85 and SD = 0.892) that the mechanism emphasizes both citizens' rights and responsibilities and help

citizens develop a realistic understanding of the challenges and constraints faced by government through information sharing and dialogue. Majority (67.5%) agreed (Mean = 3.87 and SD = 0.790) that the mechanism emphasizes both citizens' rights and responsibilities and help citizens develop a realistic understanding of the challenges and constraints

faced by government through information sharing and dialogue. They (67.5% of the respondents) also agreed (Mean = 3.8 and SD = 0.966) that there are sufficient records and data necessary for undertaking the mechanism. The respondents (67.5) agreed (Mean = 3.97 and SD = 0.800) that the mechanism is able to adequately highlight social accountability issues it seeks to address. They (60%) agreed (Mean = 4 and SD = 0.847) that the mechanism is anchored in law and it is clear to all involved on the degree of formalization. The majority (65%) agreed (Mean = 4.12 and SD = 0.647) that there is appropriate follow up of the issues generated as a result of the use of the mechanism. The respondents (77.5%) agreed (Mean = 3.77 and SD = 0.767) that there is clear evidence of improvement in the service delivery as a result of use of the mechanism. The respondents (70%)

agreed (Mean = 3.82 and SD = 0.812) that the mechanism is yielding the intended results. They (75%) also agreed (Mean = 3.85 and SD = 0.769) that the lessons learnt in utilizing the mechanism is shared widely and used to improve the use of the mechanism. However, the respondents (72.5%) did not know (Mean = 3.22 and SD = 0.733) if the mechanism is well understood by all stakeholders. They (65%) did not know (Mean = 3.20 and SD = 0.790) if there are sufficiently competent numbers of stakeholders involved in the utilization of the mechanism, including vulnerable groups such as women, disabled, youth and minorities. They (50%) also did not know (Mean = 3.20 and SD = 0.888) if the mechanism is clear on lines of accountability in terms of planning, budgeting, expenditure, monitoring and evaluation.

Table 3: governance

| Statement | SD % | D % | DK % | A % | SA % | Mean | SD |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| There is a clear understanding and appreciation of the role of social accountability mechanisms in enhancing good governance in Kenya. | 0.0 | 20.0 | 5.0 | 60.0 | 15.0 | 3.70 | .966 |
| Civil society engagement in social accountability is systematic and sustainable. | 2.5 | 15.0 | 10.0 | 55.0 | 17.5 | 3.70 | 1.018 |
| Civil society utilizes appropriate social accountability mechanisms and tools in enhancing good governance in Kenya. | 7.5 | 32.5 | 22.5 | 35.0 | 2.5 | 2.93 | 1.047 |
| CSOs/Citizens feel they have access to all relevant information on government policies, plans, budgets and programmes. | 15.0 | 50.0 | 10.0 | 17.5 | 7.5 | 2.53 | 1.176 |
| There are significant bottlenecks hindering CSOs/Citizens from adequately accessing information on government policies, plans, budget, and programmes. | 12.5 | 22.5 | 22.5 | 15.0 | 27.5 | 3.23 | 1.405 |
| Government authorities are able to account for their use of public resources in a structured, transparent and timely manner. | 15.0 | 42.5 | 10.0 | 17.5 | 15.0 | 2.75 | 1.335 |
| There are institutional/formal mechanisms in place for CSOs/citizens to engage with government policy makers and service providers. | 0.0 | 30.0 | 12.5 | 55.0 | 2.5 | 3.30 | .939 |
| The opinions and priorities of citizens were taken into consideration in design of policies, plans, budgets and programmes affecting them. | 15.0 | 47.5 | 10.0 | 22.5 | 5.0 | 2.55 | 1.154 |
| There exist adequate structures and systems for CSOs/citizens to air their grievances to relevant authorities. | 5.0 | 57.5 | 15.0 | 17.5 | 5.0 | 2.60 | 1.008 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Citizens take adequate measures to safeguard their rights to quality basic services without prejudice. | 10.0 | 32.5 | 27.5 | 27.5 | 2.5 | 2.80 | 1.043 |
| There are significant gains from CSO engagements in social accountability in terms of improvements in provision of basic services and prudent utilisation of public resources. | 5.0 | 5.0 | 12.5 | 60.0 | 17.5 | 3.80 | .966 |
| Duty bearers have embraced public participation as a requirement for proper policy development and provision of services. | 0.0 | 30.0 | 10.0 | 42.5 | 17.5 | 3.48 | 1.109 |

As observed in Table 3, majority (60%) of the respondents agreed (Mean = 3.70 and SD = 0.966) that they clearly understand and appreciate the role of social accountability mechanisms in enhancing good governance in Kenya. Majority (55%) of the respondents also agreed (Mean = 3.70 and SD = 1.108) that civil society engagement in social accountability is systematic and sustainable. Although the majority (32.5%) of the respondents disagreed that the civil society utilizes appropriate social accountability mechanisms and tools in enhancing good governance in Kenya, there was a general perception (22.5%) among respondents that they do not know (Mean = 2.93 and SD = 1.047) if the civil society utilizes appropriate social accountability mechanisms and tools in enhancing good governance in Kenya. Majority (50%) of the respondents disagreed (Mean = 2.53 and SD = 1.176) that CSOs/Citizens have access to all relevant information on government policies, plans, budgets and programmes. However, 22.5% do not know (Mean = 2.23 and SD = 1.405) whether there are significant bottlenecks hindering CSOs/Citizens from adequately accessing information on government policies, plans, budget, and programmes. Although the majority (42.5%) disagreed that the Government authorities are able to account for their use of public resources in a structured, transparent and timely manner. The general perception of the respondents is that they do not know (Mean = 2.75 and SD = 1.335) whether government authorities are able to account for their use of public resources in a structured,

transparent and timely manner. Even thou the majority (55.0%) agreed that there are institutional/formal mechanisms in place for CSOs/citizens to engage with government policy makers and service provides, overall, respondents indicated they do not know (Mean = 3.30 and SD = 0.939) whether institutional/formal mechanisms are in place for CSOs/citizens to engage with government policy makers and service provides. Majority (47.5%) of the respondents disagreed that the opinions and priorities of citizens are taken into consideration in design of policies, plans, budgets and programmes affecting them. In addition, majority (57.5%) of the respondents disagreed that there exists adequate structures and systems for CSOs/citizens to air their grievances to relevant authorities. Although the majority (32.5%) of the respondents disagreed that citizens take adequate measures to safeguard their rights to quality basic services without prejudice. Generally, the respondents (27.5%) did not know (Mean = 2.80 and SD = 1.043) whether the citizens take adequate measures to safeguard their rights to quality basic services without prejudice. Majority (60.0%) of the respondents agreed (Mean = 3.80 and SD = 0.966) that there are significant gains from CSO engagements in social accountability in terms of improvements in provision of basic services and prudent utilisation of public resources. The majority (42.5) of the respondents agreed (Mean= 3.48 and SD = 1.109) that duty bearers have embraced public participation as a requirement for proper policy development and provision of services.

Table 4: Correlation analysis

| | | Governance |
|----------------------------|---------------------|------------|
| Community Scorecard | Pearson Correlation | .528 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000 |
| | N | 60 |
| Social Audit | Pearson Correlation | .524 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .001 |
| | N | 60 |

Community scorecards mechanism was positively correlated and significantly correlated to governance in Kenya ($r=.528, p=.000$). Thus implies that community scorecards mechanism have positive influence on governance in Kenya.

Social audit mechanism was positively and significantly correlated to governance in Kenya ($r=.524, p=.001$). Thus implying that social audit mechanism have positive influence on governance in Kenya.

Regression analysis

Regression analysis was done to establish relationship between social audit mechanism and governance. The results revealed that R^2 was 0.275; this implies that only 27.5% of the variations in

governance are explained by social audit mechanism in the model. The model is a good fit. ANOVA analysis showed that F-statistics of the model was 14.399 with p-value of 0.001, which is less than the level of significance of 0.05. Thus social audit mechanism is statistically insignificant in predicting governance. Social audit mechanism has coefficient of 0.349 with a p-value of 0.001 from the results. The coefficient is statistically insignificant. Previous study have also found that social audit mechanism of social accountability to influence national policy and region which used social audit performed better as compared to the other states where social audit is not used (Fox, 2015).

Table 5: Social Audit Mechanism Regression Analysis

| Model Summary | | | | |
|--|-------------------|----------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
| 1 | .524 ^a | .275 | .256 | .83714 |
| a. Predictors: (Constant), Social Audit | | | | |

| ANOVA^a | | | | | | |
|--|------------|----------------|----|-------------|--------|-------------------|
| Model | | Sum of Squares | Df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| 1 | Regression | 10.090 | 1 | 10.090 | 14.399 | .001 ^b |
| | Residual | 26.630 | 38 | .701 | | |
| | Total | 36.721 | 39 | | | |
| a. Dependent Variable: Governance | | | | | | |
| b. Predictors: (Constant), Social Audit | | | | | | |

| Coefficients^a | | | | | | |
|--|--------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|------|-------|------|
| Model | | Unstandardized Coefficients | Standardized Coefficients | T | Sig. | |
| | | B | Std. Error | Beta | | |
| 1 | (Constant) | 1.401 | .213 | | 6.567 | .000 |
| | Social Audit | .349 | .092 | .524 | 3.795 | .001 |
| a. Dependent Variable: Governance | | | | | | |

Regression analysis was done to establish relationship between community scorecards and governance. The results revealed that R^2 was 0.278; this implies that only 27.8% of the variations in governance are explained by community scorecards mechanism in the model. The model is a good fit. ANOVA analysis showed that F-statistics of the model was 14.660 with p-value of 0.00, which is less than the level of significance of 0.05. Thus community scorecards mechanism is statistically

significant in predicting governance. Community scorecards mechanism has coefficient of 3.829 with a p-value of 0.00 from the results. The coefficient is statistically insignificant.

Similarly, Mcneil and Mumvuma, (2006) found that community scorecards have been instrumental in influencing plans and budgets and in making the planning process more inclusive, responsive, results-oriented and people-centered.

Table 6: Community scorecards mechanism regression analysis

| Model Summary | | | | | | |
|---|---------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------|-------------------|
| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate | | |
| 1 | .528 ^a | .278 | .259 | .83506 | | |
| a. Predictors: (Constant), Community Scorecard | | | | | | |
| ANOVA^a | | | | | | |
| Model | | Sum of Squares | Df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| 1 | Regression | 10.223 | 1 | 10.223 | 14.660 | .000 ^b |
| | Residual | 26.498 | 38 | .697 | | |
| | Total | 36.721 | 39 | | | |
| a. Dependent Variable: Governance | | | | | | |
| b. Predictors: (Constant), Community Scorecard | | | | | | |
| Coefficients^a | | | | | | |
| Model | | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | T | Sig. |
| | | B | Std. Error | Beta | | |
| 1 | (Constant) | 1.407 | .211 | | 6.676 | .000 |
| | Community Scorecard | .352 | .092 | .528 | 3.829 | .000 |
| a. Dependent Variable: Governance | | | | | | |

Moderated multiple linear regression model

A regression analysis of overall model was carried out in the study together with moderator variable. R^2 statistics of governance from the results was 0.812. This means 81.2% of variation in governance is explained by social audit and community scorecards when moderated by government regulations. The F-statistics of the model was 34.0889 with p-value of 0.00, which is less than

significance level of 0.05. Thus the model is significant in predicting the level of governance. From the result of the p values of social audit (p=0.000) and community scorecard mechanism (p=0.000) which is less than p-critical 0.05. Thus social audit and community scorecards are significant in predicting governance and significance effect on governance when moderated by government regulations. The p-value for government regulation (p=0.000) and interaction of

government regulation and social audit (p=0.015) less than p-critical of 0.05.

The findings were consistent with Speer (2012) findings that found positive relationship between governance and public participation. However, with

all findings supporting the positive influence between social accountability mechanism and governance there is not enough evidence to support the claim that participatory governance improves government performance.

Table 7: Overall moderated model Regression results

| Model Summary | | | | |
|---------------|-------------------|----------|-------------------|----------------------------|
| Model | R | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |
| 1 | .901 ^a | .812 | .737 | .39781 |

a. Predictors: (Constant), Government regulations and Social audit, Community Scorecard

| ANOVA ^a | | | | | | |
|--------------------|------------|----------------|----|-------------|---------|-------------------|
| Model | | Sum of Squares | Df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
| 1 | Regression | 22.461 | 3 | 7.487 | 34.0889 | .000 ^b |
| | Residual | 8.346 | 38 | 0.220 | | |
| | Total | 30.807 | 41 | | | |

a. Dependent Variable: Governance

b. Predictors: (Constant), Government regulations and Social audit, Community Scorecard

| Coefficients ^a | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|---|-----------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------|------|
| Model | | Unstandardized Coefficients | | Standardized Coefficients | t | Sig. |
| | | B | Std. Error | Beta | | |
| 1 | (Constant) | .417 | .158 | | 2.637 | .012 |
| | Social Audit | .220 | .098 | .330 | 2.250 | .000 |
| | Community Scorecard | .246 | .057 | .376 | 4.315 | .000 |
| | Government Regulations | .374 | .096 | .457 | 3.882 | .000 |
| | Government regulations and Social audit | .291 | .114 | .314 | 2.548 | .015 |

a. Dependent Variable: Governance

Conclusions

Based on findings of the study, social audit mechanism used by CSOs was found to be significantly associated with governance. Thus, the study concluded that the social audit mechanism

used by CSOs positively influences governance in Kenya.

The findings of this study established that the community scorecard mechanism used by civil society organizations was found to be significantly associated with governance in Kenya. Thus, the

study concluded that the use of community scorecard mechanism used by CSOs has positively influenced governance in Kenya.

Recommendations

This research recommended sensitization on the lessons learnt in utilizing the mechanism is shared widely and used to improve the use of the mechanism, and dissemination of the results yielded by the mechanism. In addition, there is a need to emphasize in the mechanism both citizens' rights and responsibilities and help citizens develop a realistic understanding of the challenges and constraints faced by government through information sharing and dialogue.

There is need for improved sensitization on the mechanism to enable the stakeholders

understanding. There is also need for audit as to whether there are sufficiently competent numbers of stakeholders involved in the utilization of the mechanism, including vulnerable groups such as women, disabled, youth and minorities. Similarly, there is need for clarity as to whether the mechanism is clear on lines of accountability in terms of planning, budgeting, expenditure, monitoring and evaluation.

Areas of Further Research

Further study could also focus on the impact of social audit and community scorecard mechanisms on specific service delivery areas such as health, education or social services and determine which mechanisms could also give more information on its contribution to accountability.

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