



FACTORS INFLUENCING POWER SHARING SYSTEM IN SOMALI POLITICS

KAMAL HASSAN UGAS, NAGIB OMAR

FACTORS INFLUENCING POWER SHARING SYSTEM IN SOMALI POLITICS

Kamal Hassan Ugas^{*1}, Nagib Omar²

^{*1} Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology [JKUAT], P.O BOX 81310-80100 Mombasa, Kenya

² Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology [JKUAT], P.O BOX 81310-80100 Mombasa, Kenya

Accepted: October 2, 2017

ABSTRACT

Although Somali people share the same religion, language and culture, unlike most African countries, one of the worst civil wars in history has destroyed their country for more than two decades. There has been lack of properly functioning government in Somalia since 1991.

This Research Project examined the key factors influencing the Political Power Sharing System in Somalia. The study also explored the effect these factors had on peace and stability in Somalia as a whole. In the end, it highlighted the strategies that could help establish long-lasting peace, stability and properly functioning government.

The researcher argued that external mediation, top-down peace talks and the constitution review influenced negatively the current power sharing system in Somali politics and these were the basic factors obstructing the functioning of Somali power sharing system. The way the international community was addressing the mediation in Somalia which was making the Somalis guests instead of owners, lack of bottom-up peace talks and the struggle of finding genuine representation of all parts of the Somali society including women and youth and the introduction of federalism in the constitution review at a time Somalia had not been ready for it attributed to the failure of the political power sharing system in Somalia.

Therefore, all these factors that were barrier to successful power sharing in Somalia were investigated in this study. The target population was from the five major clans in Somalia and the study was conducted in Mogadishu where all representatives could be reached. Questionnaires and interviews were used as data collection instruments and the collected data was processed and analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to find answers to the long lasting conflicts in Somalia and strategies to tackle these factors.

Key Words: Power Sharing, Mediation, Peace Talks, Constitution Review, Federalism, Clan

INTRODUCTION

Power sharing is conflict solution tool for countries where civil war is a problem to the country's stability. According to Lijphart (2004), power sharing is political principles that provide assurance of the involvement of those who represent all important community groups in making political decisions, in particular, the highest positions (Papagianni, 2007). Power sharing was used in many conflict-ridden countries. It can be successful for some societies but unsuccessful for others. As power sharing has been used for many countries in conflicts in the past such as Nigeria, South Africa, Rwanda and others, there have been various outcomes from different countries.

Power sharing in some countries had been successful whereby others the worst had happened. For example, as Traniello (2008) stated Nelson Mandela became the elected President of South Africa on 27 April 2004 in the first rightful elections and that put to an end of the country's long-existed apartheid in South Africa. In the same month, in Rwanda, Hutu Power started to deliberately massacre masses of Tutsis numbering between 500,000 and a million and also killing tens of thousands of non-extreme Hutus atrociously in a short period of time. These events make South Africa an example where other societies in conflict can learn from their extremely extraordinary transition. Contrarily, Rwanda, took the place of completely different direction, which was an extreme disaster to take lessons to keep from happening. These extreme results, happening in a very short time, made these two countries notably interesting and consequential to be compared (Traniello, 2008).

Since power sharing was the key to the stability and democracy of South Africa, can it be said that power sharing is the best option for those communities divided by the brutal civil wars? Can it be a tool for the warring societies, such as Somalia, to welcome each other and stop their rivalries to power and resources? But what worked for one country might not work for other

as seen in South Africa and Rwanda. Somalia, a country that encountered one of the longest and worst civil wars in the history of Africa, had been without functioning government for two decades after the downfall of the military regime that ruled the country for 21 years. Despite being mostly from the same ethnic group, having the same language and also practising the same religion, Somalia experienced brutal civil wars.

Despite many great efforts made to solve the Somali political problems, almost all of them have been unsuccessful other than a glimpse of stability in Mogadishu, the capital. More than two decades of conferences and reconciliations, the Somali political conflict is still unsolved mystery. Even though this power sharing system could not serve permanently, it is supposed to achieve stability and temporarily be a bridge in the preparation of democratic elections in 2016. It is worth mentioning that there is a Somali government, which is recognised internationally, but very little progress has been made compared to the expectations of the public.

Claims that the Somali political power sharing system is the only way to solve the political problems in the current situation is partly true as it resolves most of conflicts among clans in the short term but not in the long-run. Somalis constantly debate about this Somali political power sharing system and its injustices to the minority groups but what needs to be questioned is: what stops the power sharing system from functioning. Ongoing political conflicts have arisen that shed new light on the functionality of the system, therefore, this study will explore in depth the factors influencing the power sharing system.

The international community initiates and gives support to conflicting parties to reach power sharing and give up engaging in war (Sisk, 2003). The international community is always the facilitator of negotiations whenever conflict arises among societies. Kazmierczak acknowledges that the reason why mediators intervene is not only to

resolve conflicts but guarding and protecting their own interests. Although mediation is good thing to do, it seems that sometimes it goes beyond its limitation and the mediation efforts get biased. Sisk (1996) points out that when the mediator goes beyond their role of making negotiations easy for the conflicting parties and supports power sharing solution, the process engages choosing sides. Stressing that the biased mediators are important, Svensson (2013) argues that there are situations where biased mediators do better than the neutral mediators. He also points out that even though the biased mediators' effectiveness exceeds that of the neutral mediators, it is not necessarily mean that neutral mediators are not important. Regarding the Somali culture, it is difficult to gain unfavoured party's trust concerning a biased mediator and Nathan (2008) insists that whether or not bias is justified, the biased mediator will not be trusted by the party in concern "as surely as a soccer team mistrusts a jaundiced referee" and this makes them part of the conflict.

Moreover, Menkhaus (2010) expresses that external mediators having little knowledge about the entangled Somalia's politics compels the diplomats to take the wrong route in the mediation. In addition, Menkhaus (2010) highlights the over-emphasis of the international mediators about state reviving and power sharing accords without proper national reconciliation in place. Therefore, biased mediation, lack of knowledge about the complexity of Somali politics and also the mediators' quick-fix state revival instead of actual reconciliation among Somalis, have an impact on Somali political power sharing.

Somalia is one of many African countries including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and South Sudan that adopted new constitution with the purpose of ending their long term political conflicts, war and even chaos by creating effective governments and institutions, as Kouroutakis (2014) explains. Along the path of ending the transitional period of Somali governments, a provisional constitution

was formed although many think that it needs some amendments. The provisional constitution, which Kouroutakis (2014) defines as "the supreme law of Federal Republic of Somalia" revives the federalism of the era of colonisation. Kouroutakis (2014) further highlights that present federalism in Somalia is in conformity with the diversity of the Somali society since Somalia was separated into many regions and decentralised government earlier the decolonisation period. However, some people argue that Somalia is not ready for federalism and the reason is that in every region there are many clans living together so instead of regional federalism, people tend to be trapped in their clannism mindset, therefore, the clannization of federalism risks that the society in the regions fall into clan conflicts. Zoppi (2013), highlights the risk of clan federalism rather than regional federalism as "tribalization of Somalia", clan rivalries and reiterated conflicts. Another problem of federalism can be that some of the federal states may have special relations with hostile countries. African rulers have the alarm of the possibility of minority groups working with 'neighbouring hostile countries' (Teshome B & Záhořík, 2008).

Peace talk is another important factor that needs to be looked at. Somalis has experienced one of the longest civil wars in Africa and that destroyed the relationships among the Somali society. In order to achieve a sustainable peace in Somalia, there is the need to fix these relationships. The need for a genuine reconciliation among Somali clans and sub-clans including all clans to fix the damaged relationships is crucial, (Hersi, 2015). Sanei (2014) explains Somalia does not only need simply reconciliation, but it needs a genuine reconciliation to heal the hurt as a whole and establish a healing process, (Hersi, 2015). In addition, peace processes should start from the bottom at a district level to national level to make sure the inclusiveness of all Somali society. In order to do this, it is important to establish the genuine representatives of every clan and sub-

clan. Equally problematic, in the context of peace talks, is representation. Choosing the right representatives in Somali peace talks is a daunting task as there are always frontline representatives who have no interest in peace. Political representation in externally supported peace talks in Somalia has been based on a mixture of clan, military and financial power, which strengthened the prestige of warlords and political elites from diaspora, and these representatives lack interest in peace and legitimacy in Somalia (Hoehne, 2010). According to Mohamoud (2006), the peace process has to be locally driven and the main players to be local-level leaders such as traditional elders, religious leaders, community leaders and local traders (Netabay, 2007). Therefore, the peace talks need to be from the bottom up and set true representation in the peace process.

The factors set out show an influence on Somali power sharing. External mediators' own biases and lack of deep understanding of Somalis; Somali peace talks being from top to bottom and the constitution's choice of forming federal states demonstrate that they have an impact on Somali power sharing. Their influence shows a gap in literature. Most of the research dealt with these factors in general, however, almost no research done on their influence on Somali power sharing. Therefore, this research is an addition to existing literature on these factors and addresses the effects of these factors on the power sharing.

Finally, the next chapters outline broadly this field of study and are going to focus on the research problem. A careful analysis of the evidence shows that Somali power sharing system is far from being successful due to these factors. In order to better understand the complexities of the problem, we need to look closer at those factors affecting the current power sharing system in Somalia. This is what the researcher is investigating in this study conducted in this project proposal and prepares a literature overview and analyses of methodologies.

Finding lasting solution for the endless conflicts in Somalia has been one of the most critical issues facing the international community and Somalis themselves. However, numerous attempts have been made by the international community but almost all of these efforts and their power sharing deals end in failure.

Firstly, when mediation is not addressed properly in the power sharing deal, failure in the power sharing is inevitable. Highlighting one of the external mediators' failures, Menkhaus (2010) pointed out that the external mediators has been acting with a very little knowledge of Somalia's puzzled politics, complicating the situation further. Due to their knowledge and relationships with the conflicting parties, the insiders' mediation is crucial. According to Mason (2009), insiders have comprehensive knowledge of the affairs and closer connection with the conflicting sides, which let them have an impact on their behaviour. Culturally, the Somali society is very complex regarding foreign mediation as they had a history of traditional mediation, and this makes the mediation more challenging. Secondly, the peace processes used in the Somali peace talks, which are from the top to bottom, widely narrow the chance of successful power sharing. In an interview with Somali elder Isaak Ibrahim answering the question: How can Somalia recover in terms of peace and stability? Ibrahim explains that Somalia will recover from the present situation if the resolution is set up from 'the grassroots level' and using 'a bottom-up approach' (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).

Thirdly, the formation of federal states in the provisional constitution turned out to be tribalization of the regions which in turn causes Somalia to be back to the days of clan-fighting which was the root cause of Somali state collapse. As Mohamoud (2015), highlights every major clan intends to have their own autonomous region which is opposed to the criteria of the federalism in Somalia. As a result of this, there is the risk of clan conflicts and discrimination of minority clans as the majority clans ignore the rights of the

minority clans living in the same region with them and this increases the hostility among the clans living together. Furthermore, some of the Somali states have special relationships and sign their own agreements with hostile neighbouring countries without the consultation of the Central Federal Government, which is another risk of federalism. Ethiopia and Puntland signed agreements such as strengthening ties, business development and security, (Goobjoog News, 2015). Therefore, this even makes the situation of Somalia more difficult as Somalia is not prepared for federalism yet in the same way as many other third world countries. In spite of the success of federalism in the West, there are many countries where federalism disastrously faced failure (Teshome B & Záhořík, 2008), including Eastern European and Developing countries (Watts 1998: 132).

Given the ineffectiveness of top to bottom peace talks, use of only external mediation and the federalism in the provisional constitution, and the need for power sharing that works for Somalia; there is a need to better understand and be able to perceive the great complexities of these factors and their influence of these factors in order to find a better way of reaching power sharing deal that works for all Somali society. Therefore, it is paramount to conduct a research to determine these factors and establish their influence on Somali political power sharing system.

Study Objectives

This Research Project examined the factors influencing the Political Power Sharing System in Somalia. The specific objectives of the study were:-

- To determine the effects of political mediation on power sharing system in Somalia.
- To analyze the effects of political peace talks on power sharing system in Somalia.

- To assess the effects of constitution review on power sharing system in Somalia.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Framework

Lijphart's power sharing theory

Lijphart's power sharing theory put forward that power sharing warrants the peaceful governance of profoundly split societies. Lijphart (2008) contended that it is possible to govern basically divided societies democratically with the condition of having elites working jointly as a whole towards the same target in place. The concept of cooperating elite that Lijphart pointed to as the success criteria of governing profoundly divided societies democratically is analyzed in this study. Although this study shares the notion that power sharing enables the governance of deeply divided societies, the question lies on finding elite aiming together towards the same goal and the concept of having only political power sharing in place is not enough.. In order to find elite targeting together the same goal need successful political mediation and peace processes.

Kydd's mediation theory

Contrary to Kydd's mediation model, which perceives that biased mediation intensifies credibility of mediators, Fisher (1995) and Young (1967) hold that mediation to be successful, mediators must be fair and unbiased. Another important fact is that sound peace talks is the key of finding cooperating elite.

Lederach's peace building theory

In his theory, Lederach (1997) asserted that successful peace building results from the inclusiveness of all parts of society but not only dealing with high-level political actors. In addition, Saalax & Ibrahim (2010) argued that numerous Somali peace and reconciliation processes brought out deals but unfortunately never tackled adequately the issues of the exact

ills among the Somali clans and society as a whole. Therefore, it is surprising to think about finding a cooperating elite while all these issues are underestimated.

Conceptual Framework




Figure 1: Conceptual framework

Political Mediation

This study was to find out alternative approaches to the external mediation, and to the failed mediation efforts in Somali political conflicts. Past researches had shown that, although different approaches were used, all the Somali diplomatic conferences ended in failure; and “Poor mediation” was one of the key contributors of these failures, (Menkhaus, 2010). Relationship analyses of mediation and Somali power sharing will be an important part of the study process. For instance, external mediators and the supporters of peace processes are the key players in the promotion of power sharing as a conflict solution tool, (Gündüz & Davis, 2011).

Although studies in the past showed that mediation was very important regarding the facilitation of reaching power sharing deal by the conflicting sides, the political power sharing in Somalia, however, seems to be very shaky. The external mediation approaches in Somali politics needed to be reviewed as it was hard for the international mediators to understand the complexities of Somali politics and culture. In the past six major Somali peace conferences, there were power sharing arrangements reached but the blow was particularly hard for the issue of implementing it. Assessing the external mediation in Somali political power sharing, Menkhaus (2010) points out the little knowledge of the external mediators about “Somalia’s complex political dynamics” complicating the situation more with the likelihood of the wrong judgement the mediators. Mason,(2009) shed on light the importance of cultural knowledge and trust of the conflicting parties in mediation, and that these are what insider mediators can offer such as mediators of Nepal, Padma Ratna Tuldhar and Mali, Ibrahim ag Youssouf; Tuldhar mediated the major conflicting sides in Nepal, also having the role of “being in touch with the wider population and being a key point of contact for diplomats and mediators from the international community.”; And Youssouf had an important role of insider mediator in the Timbuktu peace process for the Mali government and Tuareg rebels.

All in all, Somali-owned mediation approach will provide support in the implementation of Somali power sharing, in particular, at a point where incorrect diagnosis of the Somali crisis leads to the wrong prescription; it is time for the international mediators to get help with the knowledge of Somali culture, (Menkhaus, 2010). The works of Ken Menkhaus (2010) and Simon Mason (2009) on outsider and insider mediation will be considered and are crucial part of this study. Therefore, in this section, IGAD,UN and Arab League political mediations in Somalia are explored.

On IGAD political mediation, After the collapse of the Somali government in 1990, USC hastily formed a government whose president was Ali Mahdi Mohamed, a businessman and a member of manifesto Group. Fighting within the members of USC emerged and led by Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aideed respectively. When the war in Iraq started the international community turned a blind eye to the crisis in Somalia for a year, therefore, it was for East African governments to initiate the first mediation process in Somalia, (Menkhaus et al, 2008). Since then, the OAU played a role in the political mediation in the Somali peace talks and initially agreed that Ethiopia represented the organization in Somalia. However, this encouraged that Ethiopia and other neighbouring countries such as Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya under the name of IGAD decided to engage in the conflict-ridden country, Somalia. The involvement of these neighbouring countries in Somalia was promoted by their own interests and conflict of the interests of these countries in IGAD happened to be part of the failures of the Somali political mediation and peace processes. As many people argue, there is few if not none of these external mediators interested in peace and reconciliation in Somalia. In order to put this into light, Ethiopia's creation of rival military factions specially SRRC due to its fears of revived Somali state and the proxy wars played in Somalia by rival countries such as Egypt and Ethiopia and also Ethiopia and Eritrea, (Menkhaus et al, 2008), could be good examples of these external mediator's disinterest in the Somali political mediation.

On UN political mediation, having many mediation initiatives led by OAU and the neighbouring IGAD countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya on board, the UN's political mediation started after a year of silence arranging a reconciliation meetings for Somalia. From that time the UN played a key role in the Somali political mediation as indicated by many UN brokered Somali Reconciliation Conferences and the role of Mohamed Sahnoun,

the UN Diplomat who was replaced after his criticism of the UN. The replacement of Sahnoun was a missed opportunity and the loss of experienced and knowledgeable mediator at an extremely crucial time, Menkhaus et al (2008). Although the UN had the trust of the most of the Somali people during its direct engagement in Somalia for the first five years of the conflict, that trust seemed to be faded away and the UN has been indirectly involved in Somalia since. In addition, as highlighted by Menkhaus (2008), the wrong diagnosis of the Somali problems led to inappropriate mediation approaches and this was the cause of many failures of the UN political mediations in Somalia. Although the UN had the trust of the most of the Somali people during its direct engagement in Somalia for the first five years of the conflict, its initiatives ended in failure and also that trust seemed faded away. The UN has been indirectly involved in Somalia since 1995 but kept repeating the same mistakes all over again and again.

On Arab League political mediation, the Arab World had its piece of the global conflicts. It experienced many wars in many countries of its members such as Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Somalia and many more. Focusing on the role played by the Arab Leagues in the mediation of Somalia, the researcher brings out the efforts of the Arab League in the solution of the long-existed conflicts.

Arab League tried to mediate the political conflicts in Somalia and brought the Somali conflicting sides to table in Khartoum, Sudan, (Irin News, 2006). The League had to deal with the conflict between the Union of Islamic Courts and the Somali Government. In 2014, Arab League sent delegates to mediate the rift between Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his former Prime Minister. Such conflicts between the Somali Presidents and their Prime Ministers became the norm and repetitive in recent years.

Political Peace Talks

Peace talk was a very important factor in the peace processes in conflict-ridden societies. To achieve peace talks that work for all Somalis, there was the need for evaluating the sincerity of the representatives, legitimacy of the representatives and the compatibility of top down approach.

On sincerity, Reckless Somali elites in the name of representatives, going around the same circles for the past two and half decades and forgetting its people in the deepest hole of darkness and despair. This unjustifiable lack of sincerity made the reconciliation of the Somali people and the representation of those who cares about this country, impossible; therefore, the implementation of sound political power sharing system in Somalia is a way far from happening.

On representation, for the past two and half decades, political representation and participation of Somali peace talks endorsed by the international community had been problematic and based on the criteria of mixed clan, military and financial capacity. This often nourished the status of the warlords and political elites from the diaspora who often lacked interest in peace or broad based legitimacy in Somalia in the long term, (Hohne, 2010).

Hohne, (2010) continued to highlight how Somali representatives changed faces and put on different “hats” in any role that suited them to guard their own interests transferring affiliation as “representation in Somalia was characterized by multiple affiliations, shifting alliances and transferable identities based on nation, clan and religion”. In addition, this had proven that Somalia had been often victim to disputes over representation, which made difficult to identify the genuine representatives who can speak for their constituency and implement the agreements, (Menkhaus, 2010) and also exclusion of women and youth as there was no representation of women and youth in the peace process.

On top down approach, almost all of Somalia’s national reconciliations ended in failure because of top-down approaches, (Netabay, 2007). Top-down approaches and lack of genuine representatives of the peace talks are obstacles to the resolution of Somali crisis. Although different scholars of research found the importance of bottom-up approach in Somali peace processes, (Netabay, 1994 and Kaplan, 2010; Hoehne, 2010; Wennmann, 2011; Marangio 2012; Byrne, 2013; Harper, 2012 cited in Hersi, 2015), the reconciliations processes still follow the same routes of failure, therefore the international community failed to find out the negative effects of top-down approach on the peace talks and reconciliation in Somalia. In an interview with Somali elder Isaak Ibrahim answering the question: How can Somalia recover in terms of peace and stability? Ibrahim explains that Somalia will recover from the present situation if the resolution is set up from ‘the grassroots level’ and using ‘a bottom-up approach’ (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).

Constitutional Review

As Somalia had been in turmoil for a quarter decade, the international community and Somali people saw the need to evaluate the Somali constitution of laws in order to make sure that these laws are in line with the current situation of Somalia. Since Somali experiences tremendous change in relation to its constitutional laws, the restructuring and the evaluation of the Constitution begin with the assistance of Max Planck Foundation.

On introduction to federalism, many countries adopted federalism to satisfy the territory-based differences of ethnically, culturally and linguistically divided societies, preserving unity and territorial integrity. Somalia’s Federalism in the constitutional process dates back to the establishment of the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) in 2004 and is in the Provisional constitution – the supreme law of Somali Federal Republic.

Although federalism was introduced to Somalia by the colonial powers before the decolonisation (Kouroutakis, 2014), it seems to be initiated again by the international community with the excuse that it corresponds to “the diversity of the Somali society”.

On regional borders, one of the toughest issues Somalia faced in the wake of Federal States formation was the regional borders. An example of this is the formation of Galmudug, where Galkayo town is divided between Puntland and Galmudug States based on the two clans living in the same town but each supports the State where the rest of their clan reside. Such regional border problems are the cause of recurring conflicts between these States each claiming to be in compliance with the constitution.

On clan conflicts, as the majority of Somali scholars and intellectuals believe that Somalia, for the time being, is not ready for federal system, the international community involved in Somalia political processes and some of the Somali elites perceive Somalia benefits from such a system. Since the clan-based federalism encourages clan loyalty and strengthens the mentality of clannism that Somalia suffered from for quarter of a century, it influences the political power sharing in Somalia as this puts Somalia in the same cycles of clan conflicts again and again. However, in order to prove this, field research is inevitable.

Political Power Sharing in Somalia

On federal power sharing, federalism is defined as the "combination of shared-rule and regional self-rule within a single political system so that neither is subordinate to another." (Watts, 1996 as cited in Elmi, 2014). Federal political system had been used by some countries for centuries as it dates back as far as (1789) in United States of America, (1848) in Switzerland, (1867) in Canada, and (1901) in Australia (Watts 1998: 132). Although such a length of time shows the success of federalism in the western world, there are miserable failures in many Eastern European and

third world countries (Watts 1998: 132, cited in Teshome and Záhořík, 2008).

In Africa, federal system is related with the “colonial experience of divide and rule” (Assefa 2007:10, cited in Teshome and Záhořík, 2008). Although the British colonists had tried to introduce federalism in some African countries, there was a strong resistance from the African leaders realizing it was another form of “divide and rule”, (Teshome and Záhořík, 2008). Burgess 2012 states the negative image of federalism in Africa, its success being small and its failure extensive.

According to proponents of federalism, it provides fair division of national resources and protection. The Somali advocate of federalism, Waldo considers federalism as a viable option for Somalia using Puntland as a basis of his claim; justifying his preference, Waldo considered the following: “1) that this system of zonal self-governing was the best approach that Somali communities could, under the circumstances, heal and overcome the fear, hatred and distrust of the bloody civil war; 2) that it offered a middle solution between an autocratic, centralized system of governance and outright secession; and 3) that decentralization empowered district and regional communities and offered more balanced and more productive socio-economic development opportunities,” (Waldo, 2010). Luak explains that federalism is efficient in allocating national resources considering people’s local needs, (Luak, 2014).

Some advocates for federal systems consider that the federalism is the right choice for Somalia, (Waldo, 2010). However, that claim does not completely take into account the problems associated with this model which make it unviable solution for Somalia conflicts (Hersi, 2004) because such a claim needs understanding its effects and greater knowledge of Somali society itself. Hersi (2004) states the reason as to why federalism is not an option for Somalia that there is no single part of Somalia that can stand itself

economically and at the same time this federalism can further divide the Somali society into clans and create clan bitterness similar way as the one created by the civil war. Hersi's argument is closer to the concept of Hohne, (2010) who believes that the concepts of federalism is ineffective in Somalia in the same way of the 4.5 formula – a clan-based formula.

Uluso (2013) contends that the Somali clan-based federalism is against the provisional constitution as it is specifically against the articles: "Article 8 on the people and citizenship; Article 11 concerning equality of all citizens and prohibition of clan based discrimination; Article 21 on the Freedom of movement and residence." He also states that federalism tears Somalia apart.

On regional power sharing, regional power sharing is very complicated regarding the way the Somali population reside in the regions. The issue of power sharing has been problematic in Somalia since the introduction of Federalism which divided Somalia into six states: 1. Somaliland, 2. Puntland, 3. Jubaland, 4. Galmudug, 5. South West State, 6. Hir-Shabelle. Somali society consists of clans, each clan resides a region with other clans, and no clan wants to be divided into two states. An example of this are the region Sool which resides between Somaliland and Puntland each claiming Sool region is theirs as the clans living in Sool region are partially from the same clans as those living in Somaliland and partially those living in Puntland. Same thing is happening in the town of Galkayo in Mudug region upon which Puntland and Galmudug states had conflicts over the control of this region as the two major clans in this region are from Puntland and Galmudug and this town is divided into two. This regional power sharing, therefore, seems complicates regarding the clan identity these people believe more than their regional identity.

On clan power sharing, clan power sharing is not new in the Somali politics as Somalis are divided into clans. Since the Somali civil wars were clan

based, Somalia practises a clan-based power sharing system which is the only conflict solution tool that works for the Somali people so far regardless its drawbacks. This clan-based power sharing system is called 4.5 (Four-Point-Five) which Eno & Eno (2011) defined as dividing the Somali communities as four major clans and half a clan (various minority clans put together) making the major clans as Somali and the minority clans known as others less Somali giving them half the share of a clan.

The present power sharing system in Somalia has its own inadequacy which seems to be unknown to the policy makers and the academia, (Hersi et al, 2015). Many scholars point out the problems of the current Somali power sharing that neglects the rights of some of its own citizens and opens to the door to more grievances, promoting the formation of spoilers by those who feel that they have not received their fair share. (Mosley, 2015) explains the need for respect of the minority clans during the formation of the federal states due to the logic of 4.5 power sharing as the major clans have the influence of "Political processes, the control of land and resources, and the benefits of political office and patronage", fuelling the outrage of the minority groups. Recent study has revealed the failure of the current Somali power sharing in ending the political and socio-economical conflicts, recommending a power-sharing system that encourages collective and sound relationship between elites that paves the way to political democracy that is just and an upright in Somalia, (Hersi et al, 2015). Given the important role of power sharing as a conflict solution tool and its ineffectiveness for Somalia, it is important to analyze what makes this power sharing ineffective.

In Somali Conference in Sodere Ethiopia in 1996, the international community promoted the consociational power sharing in Somalia. Consociationalism referring to non-majoritarian democracy is mostly associated with the works by Arend Lijphart. This type of non-majoritarian

power sharing has the characteristics of pro-rata representation, (Lijphart, 1985). Although the representation is clan-based in Somalia under the formula called 4.5 power sharing, this kind of power sharing formula is much criticized by some scholars because of its discrimination towards minority clans (Eno & Eno, 2011). One study has shown that many challenges were faced in the application of Somali power sharing system such as growing clan loyalty and turning down the nationalism, (Hersi et al 2015). Bakayr, 2007 highlighted that the damage of the clannish ideologies on the Somali society are irreparable and nationalism has no place in today's Somali history. As a result, a great number of research has addressed the weaknesses of the Somali power sharing system and one scholar criticized it as one sensitive to political manipulation and concretization of clan loyalty, (Menkhaus 2010).

This research project examines the impact of factors that make the current system ineffective. The researchers surprisingly failed to address this area, and most of the literature on power sharing has focussed on only the discrimination of minority clans named as "Others" in the 4.5 Somali power sharing system. Although the importance of power sharing is a long-established reality, a solid theoretical explanation of its effectiveness in Somalia in particular needs to be established.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this study, the researcher adopted a methodology commonly called a mixed methodology. Mixed methodology designs integrate qualitative and quantitative methods. Mixed methodology rigorously combines both methodologies to study the same phenomena. Mixed methodology yields the strength that counteracts the weaknesses of each of the qualitative and quantitative research methodologies, (Creswell, 2006). A sample size of 80 respondents was selected from the target population of 100 using Sloven's formula.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Political Mediation

The respondents were offered to indicate their preference using strongly disagreed, disagreed, undecided, agree and strongly agreed to show their choice of preference with the scale of 1 being strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree.

Illustrating how the respondents presented their views regarding the political mediation, 53 (66.25%) of the respondents had either agreed or strongly agreed to the fact that foreign mediation was barrier to genuine reconciliation among Somalia while 18 (22.50%) either disagreed or strongly disagreed and the rest which was 9 (11.25%) could not decide. 56 (70%) of the respondents believed that lack of Somali cultural knowledge of the foreign mediators tangles the situation more; whereby 13 (16.25%) argued against the fact that cultural knowledge was not that important in mediating the sides in conflict and 11 (13.75%) remained undecided. 55 (68.75%) felt that the Somali political mediation process was completely foreigners driven, therefore, the so-called Somali-ownership of the mediation process was totally missing which was another problem; 13 (16.25%) of the respondents had got the opposite view and argue there was no missing Somali ownership as the whole process was being done for Somalis while the other 8 (10%) undecided. Criticizing the external approaches used by the external political mediators, 55 (68.75%) of the respondents agreed that the current international political approaches were incompatible as far as the Somali mediation process was concerned; but 13 (16.25%) of them did not believe these approaches were incompatible while the other 12 (15%) were neutral. Asking if the external mediation affected the political power sharing in Somalia, 62 (77.50%) either simply or strongly believed that it affected and one of the respondents claiming that a house whose base was wobbly and not built well would collapse anyway therefore no foreign

mediation would lead this country to successful political power sharing; while 16 (20%) agreed

that it did not affect and the rest remained undecided.

Table 1: Political Mediation

No.		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
1	Foreign mediation is a barrier to genuine reconciliation	80	3.76	1.070
2	Lack of cultural knowledge of the outsider mediators	80	3.70	1.152
3	Missing Somali ownership of the political mediation process	80	3.73	1.125
4	Incompatible external mediation approaches	80	3.70	1.048
5	Political mediation affects the Somali political power sharing	80	3.74	1.040
	Valid N (listwise)	80		

Source: Field data, 2016

As far as political mediation was concerned, the statistical analysis of the study on the table 1 above showed of all the questions asked an average mean of 3.72 stating they were agreed. Participants mentioned that the Somali political process was inflamed and would keep failing unless Somalis were back to their traditional insider-led mediation while the external mediators just remained the facilitators offering the resources.

Political Peace Talks

The researcher looked into if the issue of current Somali peace talks tend to obscure or lead to successful Somali political power sharing. As a result, the researcher found out that more than

50% of the respondents believed or strongly believed that the current Somali peace talk was ineffective giving the following reasons: lack of genuine representatives 56 (70%); top-down approach as a challenge 60 (75%) so 57 (71.25%) of the respondents agreed that bottom-up approach could lead to successful peace process; 55 (68.75%) of respondents believed that the foreign mediators dictated and possessed the peace talks, therefore there was the need for Somali-owned peace process. And 55 (68.75%) approved that current peace talks affected the implementation of political power sharing deals.

Table 2: Political Peace Talks

No.		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
6	Lack of genuine representation in peace talks	80	3.81	1.020
7	Top-down approach is one of the challenges of successful peace talks	80	3.83	0.868
8	Bottom-up approach can lead to successful peace process	80	3.95	0.940
9	The need for Somali-owned peace process	80	3.94	0.998
10	Political peace talks affects negatively the Somali political power sharing	80	3.81	1.170
	Valid N (listwise)	80		

Source: Field data, 2016

As the average mean of 3.87 in the above table 2 indicated most of the participants agreed that the

current political peace talks had its drawback and hindered the functioning of Somali political power sharing.

Constitutional Review: Federalism

As the constitutional review prompted a lot of public discussions on the issue of federalism, the researcher attempted to find out whether the constitutional aspiration for federalism enjoyed a reciprocal feeling among the Somali population. The findings indicated that 53 (66.25%) of the respondents believed that federalism was not the right choice for Somalia while 18 (22.50%) disagreed or strongly disagreed and the other 9 (11.25%) were undecided. 56 (70%) of the participants argued that the current situation in Somalia was not in line with the need to adopt federalism as the country’s resources were limited and clannism disabled the minds of most of the Somali society whereas 13 (16.25%) disagreed that the current situation in Somalia had anything to do with formation of Somali federal states and

11(13.75%) of the respondents were undecided. Since Somalia was one of those countries in the world that had been victims of colonization and surprisingly it was still raw in the minds of the Somali people even the generations after that time, therefore, 59 (73.75%) of the respondents agreed that the introduction of federalism in Somalia was a reminder of the colonial era of 'divide and rule' and revival of clan clashes; but 13 (16.25%) of the respondents disagreed and believe that was not the case while the other 8 (10%) were undecided. In addition, 55 (68.75%) of the respondents considered that introducing federalism in Somalia was not an attempt of peace making and fair share of resources as many claim while 13 (16.25%) disagreed and stated otherwise and the other 12 (15%) were undecided. Finally, 62 (77.5%) of the respondents agreed that federalism in the constitutional review affected the Somali political power sharing in a negative way although 10 (12.5%) disagreed while the other 8 (10%) were undecided.

Table 3: Federalism in the Constitution

No.		N	Mean	Std. Deviation
11	Federalism in the Provisional Constitution is not the right choice for Somalia	80	3.49	1.158
12	The current situation in Somalia is not in line with the need to adopt federalism	80	3.61	0.934
13	The introduction of federalism in Somalia is a reminder of the colonial era of 'divide and rule' and revival of clan clashes	80	3.64	0.917
14	Introducing federalism in Somalia is not an attempt of peace making and fair share of resources	80	3.61	0.948
15	Federalism in the constitutional review affects negatively the Somali political power sharing	80	3.83	0.952
	Valid N (listwise)	80		

Source: Field data, 2016

According to the findings of the table 3 above, the majority of the respondents agreed to the statements regarding federalism in the constitutional review exhibiting an average mean of 3.64, therefore it was perceivable that the

pitfalls of federalism are far more significant than its benefits. Finally, opponents of federalism argued that federalism in Somalia was the prime factor that shook the country’s already troubled stability.

CONCLUSION

As the objectives of the research were to find out how the political mediation, political peace talks and the constitutional federalism influence the political power sharing in Somalia, many challenges emerged showing their influence such as political mediation not going beyond signatories, peace talks not providing peace and stability, revival of clan clashes, fighting for power and resources. All of these hindered the functioning and implementation of the Somali political power sharing.

The political mediation taking the wrong route made the situation harder; the misrepresentation of the peace talks with a top-down approach distressed the problem more as these representatives were not recognised and they were mostly from elites from the diasporas who had not experienced the hurt of clannism that the local people had been experiencing until the present-day.

Another hindrance of the Somali political power sharing was that Somalia cannot be federal country present-time for several reasons: the Somali society's loyalty for their clans and fighting for inadequately distributed national resources causing the Somali society to be divided more than ever. Federalism had threatened the national unity of Somalia, a country that had had a troublesome history of clan clashes, by politicising of clans to fight for power and inadequately distributed national resources.

Lastly, the researcher hoped that this work would be a valuable contribution to the field of research and help the government of Somalia and its partners find a solution and working strategies for ending the long-existing suffering of Somali people.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The future political mediation processes need to be culturally tailored and Somali driven to lead to successful political mediation.

- There is the need to conduct country wide dialogue starting from districts and avoid repeating the same mistakes regarding the Somali peace processes. Therefore, consideration of bottom-up approach is crucial since it was evident that the previous top-down approaches ended in failure.
- Representation of the different parts of the Somali society in the peace talks is crucial specially women and youth.
- Genuine representation for the peace talks should be achieved through considering bottom-up approach to get rid of the false representatives.
- The adaptation of federalism in Somalia needs to be reviewed as the disadvantages of federalism outweigh its advantages.

AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

There were few recommendations of areas for further research in the future and these were as follows:

- More research needed on the sensitivity of the Somali culture towards external mediation.
- Further research should be done in search of finding a way to choose the rightful representatives for the Somali peace talks for recommendations to decision makers.
- There is the need for future research to find out the nature of Somali culture of unity and its clash with federalism.

REFERENCES

- Bakayr , M. (2007). Somalis: The Trouble with This Homogenous Society. *Hiiraan Online*, Retrieved 4 January, 2016, from http://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2007/july/somalis_the_trouble_with_this_homogenous_society.aspx
- Bradbury, M & Healy, S. (2010). Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking. *ACCORD An International Review of Peace Initiatives*, 1(21),51. Retrieved 22 October, 2015, from http://www.c-r.org/downloads/21_Somalia_2010_ENG_F.pdf
- Burgess, M. (2012, January, 2012). Federalism in Africa. [Weblog]. Retrieved 21 December 2015, from <http://ideefederale.ca/documents/Africa.pdf>
- Crescenzi , M. et al. (ND). A SUPPLY SIDE THEORY OF MEDIATION [Weblog]. Retrieved 19 March, 2016, from <http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/Crescenzi.et.al.pdf>
- Davis, L. & Gündüz, C. (2011, October, 2011). European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue eV (mediatEUR) . [Weblog]. Retrieved 22 December 2015, from http://www.themediateur.eu/resources/publications/item/download/15_14dab48e0d87b6c044fddc0d48aa711d
- Elmi, A. (2014, January, 2014). Decentralization Options for Somalia. [Weblog]. Retrieved 7 December 2015, from http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Decentralization_Options_for_Somalia-ENGLISH.pdf
- Eno, M. A. (2007). *Inclusive but Unequal: The Enigma of the 14th SNRC and the Four-Point-Five (4.5) Factor*. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/3093759/Inclusive_but_Unequal_The_Enigma_of_the_14th_SNRC_and_the_Four-Point-Five_4.5_factor
- Eno, M & Eno, O. (2011). Intellectualism amid Ethnocentrism: Mukhtar and the 4.5 Factor. *Bidhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*, 9(1), 137. Retrieved 6 April, 2015, from <http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1092&context=bildhaan>
- Goobjoog, N.E.W.S. (2015, 27th February). Puntland and Ethiopia due to form bilateral committee to brush up custom centre agreements. [Weblog]. Retrieved 23 April 2016, from <http://goobjoog.com/english/?p=10964>
- Hersi, A. (2015). Success in the Implementation of the Power-Sharing Models Regarding Management of Intractable Clan Conflict in Somalia. *International Journal of Arts and Project Management*, 2(1), 23. Retrieved 5 September, 2016, from <http://www.sagepublishers.org/recent-publications-kenya/international-journal-of-arts-and-project-management.html>
- Hoehne, M.V. (2010). Political representation in Somalia: citizenship, clanism and territoriality. *Accord*, 1(21), 4, 34,37. Retrieved 5 September, 2015, from http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2021_10Political%20representation%20in%20Somalia_2010_ENG.pdf

- Kazmierczak, M. (N/D). Which Side Are You On? The Study of Algerian and American Biased Mediation. [Weblog]. Retrieved 30 August, 2015, from <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=1321435&fileId=1321436>
- Kazmierczak, M. (30 August, 2015, N/D). Which Side Are You On? The Study of Algerian and American Biased Mediation. [Weblog]. Retrieved 30 August, 2015, from <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=1321435&fileId=1321436>
- Kouroutakis, A. (2014). The Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia: Process, Architecture and Perspectives. *Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 3(4), 1,6. Retrieved 2 September, 2015, from <http://joomla.cjicl.org.uk/journal/article/221>
- Glaser, T. (2005, December 2). *Conflict Research Consortium* [Scholarly project]. In *Building Peace*. Retrieved May 4, 2016, from <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/lede7424.htm>
- Lijphart, A. (2008, 26th May). Arend Lijphart on Sharing Power in Africa and the Future of Democracy. [Weblog]. Retrieved 11 July, 2016, from <http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/05/theory-talk-8.html>
- Lijphart, A. (1985). Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories. *Oxford Journals*, 15(2), 3-15. Retrieved 26 December, 2015, from <http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/15/2/3.full.pdf+html>
- Luak, B. (2014). Understanding Federalism. *Nyamilepedia*. Retrieved 18 November 2015 from <http://www.nyamile.com/2014/07/18/the-debate-understanding-federalism-12/>
- Mason, S. (2009). *Center for Security Studies CSS*. Retrieved 20 October, 2015, from <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Insider-Mediators.pdf>
- Menkhaus, K. (April 2007). Mediation efforts in Somalia. *Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue*, 39. Retrieved 19 August, 2015, from <http://www.hdcentre.org/en/resources/publications/filter/ken-menkhaus/>
- Menkhaus, K. (2010). Somali Peace Processes. *Diplomacy in a failed state: International mediation in Somalia*, (21), 17, 18. Retrieved 30 August, 2015, from <http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/diplomacy-failed-state-international-mediation-somalia>
- Mohamoud, M. (2015, 14th January). Federalism for Somalia: Internal and External Challenges in the Post-Traditional Period. [Weblog]. Retrieved 22 April 2016, from <http://www.somalilandpress.com/federalism-somalia/>
- Nathan, L. (2008). A Case of Undue Pressure: International Mediation in African Civil Wars. *Peace Maker UN*. Retrieved 1 September, 2015, from http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/A%20Case%20of%20Undue%20Pressure_Nathan2008.pdf

Netabay, N. (2007, March, 2007). Bottom-Up Approach: A Viable Strategy in Solving the Somali Conflict. [Weblog]. Retrieved 4 September 2015, from <http://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/netabay-bottom>

Njoku, R. (2013). *The history of Somalia*. (1 ed.). Retrieved 17 December, 2015, from https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=FIL2vE_qRQ8C&pg=PA181&lpg=PA181&dq=history+of+political+power+sharing&source=bl&ots=RocZatVjxA&sig=m-kX2DAj_mm-d_7anSGIHuDwvMc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewiEgIPivL_KAhXIQBoKHXCiCqY4ChDoAQhAMAU#v=onepage&q=history%20of%20political%20power%20sharing&f=false

Mosley, J. (2015, September, 2015). Somalia's Federal Future Layered Agendas, Risks and Opportunities. [Weblog]. Retrieved 17 December 2015, from https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150902SomaliaFederalFutureMosley.pdf

Papagianni, K. (2007). *Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue*. Retrieved 30 June, 2015, from http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/110PowerSharing-Aconfilctresolutiontool.pdf

Remond, A. (2015, 1st July, 2015). Power-sharing in Africa: Does It Still Have a Role to Play?. [Weblog]. Retrieved 12 December, 2015, from <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/01/power-sharing-in-africa-does-it-still-have-a-role-to-play/>

Sisk, T.D. (2003). Power Sharing. *Beyond Interactability*. Eds Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Retrieved 23 August 2015, from <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/power-sharing>

Sisk, T.D. (1996). *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*. (1 ed.). Retrieved 2 September, 2015, from <https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=uCBtuqnRNU8C&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=mediation+effects+on+power+sharing&ots=tuGOKUupQA&sig=KH704eqZLEF4irUOX7LKaByZKCo#v=onepage&q&f=false>

Somalia Newsroom (2015, 23rd October, 2015). (Map) Somalia Discusses Complicated Next Steps for 2016 Elections. [Weblog]. Retrieved 20 January 2016, from <http://somalianewsroom.com/2015/10/23/update-somalia-discusses-next-steps-for-2016-elections/>

Svensson, I. (2013). Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications. *Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs*, 2(1), 19. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. Retrieved 1 September, 2015, from <http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=jlia>

Traniello, M. (2008). *UCL London's Global University*. Retrieved 14 July, 2015, from <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/journal/downloads/vol3-2/Traniello.pdf>

Teshome b, W & Záhořík, J. (2008). Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia. *International Journal of Human Sciences*, 5(2), 2,3,6. Retrieved 23 October, 2015, from https://www.academia.edu/4010346/Federalism_in_Africa_The_Case_of_Ethnic-Based_Federalism_in_Ethiopia_Wondwosen_Teshome_and_Jan_Zahorik_

Ulus, M. (2013). Clan federalism tears Somalia apart. *Pambazuka News - Pan-African Voices for Freedom and Justice*, 1(615), 1. Retrieved 12 December, 2015, from <http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.php/features/86132>

University of Texas. (2012). *University of Texas Libraries*. Retrieved 20 January, 2016, from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/txu-pclmaps-oclc-795784383-somalia_2012_clan_distro.jpg

Waldo, M. (2010, 9 October, 2010). Federalism In Somalia: Birth of Puntland State and The Lessons Learned. [Weblog]. Retrieved 22 December 2015, from <https://horseedmedia.net/2010/10/09/federalism-somalia-birth-puntland-state-lessons-learned/>

Zoppi, M. (2013, 22 November, 2013). FEDERALISM: A VALID INSTRUMENT FOR RECONCILIATION IN SOMALIA? . [Weblog]. Retrieved 7 September 2015, from https://www.academia.edu/6341063/Federalism_a_valid_instrument_for_reconciliation_in_Somalia